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2055(e)(2) as a charitable annuity
remainder trust.
The court held that Johnson's
trust could not be reformed to
meet one of the Section 2055(e)(2)
exceptions while still complying
with the terms of the will. Even
though a contract could have been
bought to satisfy the family grave
maintenance, no upward limit ex-
isted on the amount required to
support Johnson's remaining sister
due to the unpredictable costs of
medical care. Therefore, the
amount of funds needed to fulfill
the noncharitable bequests could
not be accurately assessed until
after all of Johnson's sisters had
passed away. As a result, the funds
to the charitable beneficiaries
could only be assessed after all the
sisters were deceased.
Lastly, the Fifth Circuit held
that the statutory language of the
Internal Revenue Code was clear,
and no express Congressional in-
tent supported an exception in this
case.
Gwen M. Geraghty
New Jersey Supreme
Court Finds County
Board's Itemized Phone
Bills Are Not Public
Records
In North Jersey Newspapers Co.
v. Passaic County Board of Chosen
Freeholders, 601 A.2d 693 (N.J.
1992), the Supreme Court of New
Jersey held that the state's Right-
to-Know statute did not create an
unqualified right of access to a
public body's itemized telephone
billing records that disclosed the
identity of the parties called. Fur-
thermore, the telephone bills were
not accessible under New Jersey
common law because the public's
need for the identity of the parties
called did not outweigh the govern-
mental policies of confidentiality
in telephone communications and
executive privilege.
Background
To uncover possible misuse of
public funds, the North Jersey
Newspapers Company ("News-
paper"), in July 1990, requested
copies of itemized phone bills for
the office and car-phone lines of the
Passaic County Board of Chosen
Freeholders' ("Board"). Some of
these bills included date, time,
length of call, amount of charge,
and phone number called. The
Newspaper made its request pursu-
ant to New Jersey's Right-to-Know
Law, N.J.Stat.Ann. 47:A-1 to -4,
and a parallel right of access to
public records under New Jersey
common law.
The Board denied the News-
paper's request on both grounds.
First, the Board claimed that the
Right-to-Know Law allowed access
to the total amounts of a phone bill
but not to the entire itemized
document. Second, the Board ar-
gued that the public's interest in
reviewing the itemized phone bills
did not outweigh the governmental
need for confidentiality; therefore,
the Board denied the Newspaper's
request for access under the com-
mon law as well. Consequently, the
Newspaper sued in the Superior
Court, Law Division, Passaic
County, seeking access to the re-
quested records.
Proceedings in the Lower Courts
The trial court granted the
Newspaper unlimited access to the
itemized phone bills. The court
concluded that because itemized
phone bills are not specifically ex-
empted from the Right-to-Know
Law, the Newspaper should have
access to the records it sought. The
court also found that common-law
standards required accessibility
because the constitutional and pri-
vacy interests of persons tele-
phoned by Board officials did not
outweigh the public's interest in
reviewing the phone bills. The
Board appealed to the Superior
Court, Appellate Division.
The appellate court agreed that
the phone bills were public records
accessible under the Right-to-
Know Law. However, the appellate
court reversed the trial court, find-
ing that the Board's privacy inter-
ests not only were protected by the
New Jersey Constitution but also
outweighed the public's interest in
reviewing the phone bills. There-
fore, the appellate court ruled, the
Newspaper should not have unlim-
ited access to the requested re-
cords. The Newspaper appealed to
the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
Right-to-Know Law
Does Not Apply
The supreme court disagreed
with the appellate court's statutory
analysis and found that the Right-
to-Know Law did not apply to
itemized phone bills. The appellate
court's judgement was modified
accordingly.
In finding that the Right-to-
Know Law did not apply to item-
ized phone bills, the supreme court
distinguished public records acces-
sible under the Right-to-Know
Law from public records accessible
under the common law. Under the
Right-to-Know Law, the public has
an unqualified right to inspect pub-
lic documents only if the docu-
ments are records "required by law
to be made, maintained or kept on
file." In contrast, records accessi-
ble under New Jersey common law
are records made by public officers
in the exercise of their public func-
tions. The public's right to inspect
common-law records depends on
whether the public's need for the
records outweighs the govern-
ment's need for confidentiality.
The Newspaper claimed the
itemized phone bills were covered
by the Right-to-Know Law because
the Board was required to record
all the details of its telephone bills
under the Local Fiscal Affairs Law.
The Local Fiscal Affairs Law re-
quires public agencies submitting
requests for anticipated expenses
to make available a detailed bill of
items on demand. Furthermore,
the Newspaper claimed, the stan-
dard of "detailed" in the Local
Fiscal Affairs Law was meant to
grow with the times and included
information that was routinely
available. Modern technology al-
lows telephone companies to rou-
tinely provide customers with in-
formation such as date, time,
length of a call, number called, and
charge for a call. Therefore, the
Newspaper argued, because such
information was routinely avail-
able, public agencies such as the
Board were required to make item-
ized phone bills available to the
(continued on page 102)
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public under the Local Fiscal Af-
fairs Law.
The supreme court rejected the
Newspaper's arguments. The court
noted that regardless of how the
word "detailed" was interpreted,
attempting to expand the scope of
the Right-to-Know Law by refer-
ence to the requirements of a relat-
ed statute was inappropriate. In
addition, the court found that
when the Right- to-Know Law was
enacted, the legislature did not
intend for "records required by law
to be made, maintained or kept" to
apply to all the detailed informa-
tion generated by computers.
No Common-Law Right of Access
The Supreme Court of New Jer-
sey agreed with the appellate
court's common-law analysis that
the Board's privacy interests out-
weighed the public's interest in
viewing the requested records. The
supreme court found several prob-
lems with granting unlimited ac-
cess to the information in the
itemized phone bills. First, unlim-
ited access would disclose the iden-
tity of persons whom public offi-
cials had called. The court found
that such a disclosure would vio-
late these individuals' right of pri-
vacy, which extends to the people
and places called, the conversa-
tions, and the telephone bills.
Second, unlimited access would
inferentially disclose the identity of
persons who had called government
officials. This type of disclosure, the
court stated, could directly conflict
with an express legislative policy or
governmental need, such as protect-
ing the identity of those who report
child abuse to government social
workers.
Third, unlimited access would
violate the "official information"
privilege provided by the New Jer-
sey Evidence Rules, which prohib-
its disclosure of official informa-
tion when such disclosure would be
harmful to the interests of the
public. For example, the court ex-
plained, a mayor might need to call
a political activist to gain support
on a sensitive issue and disclosure
of the call could be disruptive.
The court acknowledged that the
public's interest in disclosure here
was gaining access to sufficient
information to evaluate potential
misuse of public funds by Board
officials. The court found, how-
ever, that the information already
available to the Newspaper - the
amount of the charges, the names
of the officials who incurred the
charges, and a comparison with
past expenditures - was sufficient
to satisfy the public's interest. Fur-
thermore, the information avail-
able could satisfy the public's inter-
est without disclosing the identity
of third persons who called or were
called by Board officials.
ACLU Solution Rejected
The court also rejected an argu-
ment submitted by the American
Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") on
behalf of the Newspaper. The
ACLU argued that the court should
interpret the Right-to-Know Law to
require disclosure of the detailed
telephone bills only for official calls
made by Board members. For per-
sonal calls, the ACLU recom-
mended disclosure only of the cost
and quantity of calls. The court
disagreed, however, stating that the
ACLU recommendation over-
looked the official information
privilege and failed to alleviate the
risk of disclosing the identity of
persons who called the officials.
Richard B. Vaughn
Illinois Supreme Court
Precludes Recovery of
Economic Losses
Resulting From
Negligent Legal
Representation
In Collins v. Reynard, et al, No.
70325, 1991 Ill. LEXIS 104 (Ill.
Oct. 31, 1991), the Illinois Su-
preme Court held that purely eco-
nomic losses resulting from legal
malpractice may not be recovered
under a negligence theory. The
exceptions for fraud or extracon-
tractual duties did not apply in this
case.
Background
Dorothy J. Collins ("Collins")
hired Charles Reynard and the law
partnership of Reynard and Robb
("Reynard") to negotiate the in-
stallment sale of her business to
Steven Legner ("Legner"). Legner
later pledged the assets of the busi-
ness to a bank. Upon Legner's
subsequent default, the bank re-
possessed the assets of the business
and sold them. Although Collins
had a ready, willing, and able buy-
er, she was unable to complete the
sale because the bank had already
repossessed the assets.
Collins sued Reynard in the cir-
cuit court of Sangamon County,
alleging that because Reynard neg-
ligently drafted or approved the
sales contract, the contract did not
reflect Collins' intention to retain a
first and prior security interest in
the business and the assets sold. As
a result of Reynard's negligence,
the bank had a security interest
superior to that of Collins. Collins
claimed her damages amounted to
the money due under the install-
ment contract, which included the
principal and interest, the cost of
collection, and attorney fees.
Reynard filed a motion to dis-
miss the negligence counts, arguing
that Illinois law precluded recovery
of economic loss for professional
negligence under a tort theory. The
circuit court denied Reynard's mo-
tion, but allowed Reynard to appeal
to the appellate court on the ques-
tion of the availability of such a
cause of action. The appellate court
reversed the circuit court and found
that Illinois law precluded recovery
of economic loss in tort cases, in-
cluding legal malpractice, brought
under a negligence theory. Collins
appealed to the Illinois Supreme
Court, and the Illinois Trial Law-
yers Association supported her po-
sition with a supplemental brief.
Damages are Attributable to
Economic Loss
The preliminary question before
the Illinois Supreme Court was
whether the damages sought by
Collins were attributable to eco-
nomic loss. Previously, the court
had found that injuries resulting
from legal malpractice were mone-
tary, rather than personal. Further,
in order to recover damages in the
negligence action, Collins had to
show harm beyond disappoint-
ment of expectations.
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